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Co., and Doles v. Hilton7 hold that an infant who is not shown
to be capable of transacting his own business cannot have his
disabilities removed, even by a court order made pursuant to
legislative authority, on the ground that the statute providing
for judicial emancipation should be construed as applicable only
to infants who are capable of adult conduct.
EUGENE B. C0cmAN.
THE RIGHTS AND POWERS OF AN OFFICER IN
SERVING A PROCESS.
A process, in the sense the term is employed in this article,
is the means or method used by the court to acquire jurisdiction
of a person and compel him to appear in court after suing out
the original writ in civil cases and after indictment in criminal
cases. The Kentucky Code defines the word "process" as a
writ or summons issued in the course of judicial proceedings.'
A process, in order to give the court jurisdiction of a party,
must be served by the proper officer. Ordinarily the sheriff is
the proper officer to execute all writs returnable to court. His
power is defined in this state by statute: "Each sheriff, by him-
self or deputies, shall execute and make due return of . . . all
processes which come to, and may be lawfully executed by him,
against any person . . . in his county, . ,2 In
Kentucky a process may also be served by a constable, coroner,
elisor or jailer. The power of a constable to execute a process
is thus defined: "Constables may execute bench warrants, war-
rants of arrest, distress or other warrants, summons, subpoenas,
attachments, notices, rules and all orders of courts in all crimi-
nal, penal and civil cases, and shall return all such processes,
noting the time of execution on them, to the courts or persons
issuing them. "3 The statute also provides that a process may
be served by a coroner: "A coroner may execute process in
criminal, penal and civil cases, and when so acting, the laws in
regard to sheriffs shall apply to and govern him.' '4 The power
7Dalton v. Bradley Lumber Co., 135 Ark. 392, 205 S. W. 695; Doles
v. Hilton, 48 Ark. 305, 3 S. W. 193.
' Section 732, sub. 26, Ky. Civ. Code.
2 Section 4565, Ky. Stat.
3 Section 436, Ky. Stat.4 Section 536, Ky. Stat.
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conferred upon an elisor " . to perform all acts and
duties -which are by law devolved upon sheriffs "r
confers upon hini the power to serve any kind of process. Also
by statute a process may be executed by a jailer and his power
is thus defined: "Process from any court may, in a civil, crimi-
nal or penal case, be executed by the jailer of the county, and in
all such cases the law applicable to the sheriff shall govern the
jailer.' " Also, the court may appoint a person to execute a
process. This is provided for in the Code: "The court, for good
cause, may appoint a person to serve a particular process or
order, and he shall have the same power to execute it which a
sheriff has . . . " Thus it is seen that in Kentucky, al-
though the sheriff is usually the proper officer to serve any kind
of a process, a constable, coroner, elisor, jailer or person ap-
pointed by the court may also perform this duty under certain
circumstances.
There are in general two methods of serving process: The
one actual and the other constructive service. In the case of
actual service of process, the execution is effected either by
reading the original process to the person or by delivering a
copy of it to him. Constructive service of process, which is a
substituted form of service, is made either by leaving a copy of
the process at the person's residence when he is absent or by
posting or publishing notice of the issuance of the process and
mailing a copy of the notice posted or published to the person,
if his address is known.8 Each state is at liberty to determine
for itself the procedure to be followed by the courts to acquire
jurisdiction of its citizens, but its regulations can not operate
extraterritorially. 9 Kentucky has provided that non-residents
doing business in this state who are required to execute bonds
must have agents on whom process may be served.' 0
An officer in executing a process must serve it at the proper
time, otherwise it is not effective. Service should always be
made as expeditiously as the circumstances of the particular case
permit, but in no case can it be made before the commencement
5 Section 1597, Ky. Stat.
a Section 2234, Ky. Stat.
T Section 668, Ky. Civ. Code.8 Nelson v. Chicago, B. & 0. R. Co., 235 IlM. 197, 80 N. E. 109.
9lBivteler v. Dawson, 4 Scammon (Ill.) 536, 39 Am. Dec. 430.
" Section 3270d, Ky. Stat.
KENTUc K LAW JOURNAL
of the suit." It can not be served after return day because its
vitality is thereafter lost, unless the time in which service may
be made is specifically extended by the laws of the state where
the service is being made.1 2  Service may be made at night as
well as in the daytime, but not ordinarily on Sunday or a legal
holiday. In Kentucky it is provided by statute that, "A writ
of habeas corpus, or process on a charge of treason, felony, or
for riot or breach of the peace, or upon an escape out of custody,
may be executed on Sunday.' 3
There are several classes of persons who are privileged or
exempt from being served with process at certain times or during
the course of certain events. It is very important that an officer
should be correctly informed in regard to each of these classes
of persons and that the privileges and exemptions to which each
has a right to be given the proper consideration on his part.
The most important of these classes of persons are the legislative
officers, 14 judges and attorneys at law, 15 and persons in the
military service.16 It is a serious malfeasance for any officer
to abuse any of this class of immunities for all are based on
reasons of public policy. In this state it is provided by statute
that members of the General Assembly shall not be arrested dur-
ing the existence of their constitutional privilege except on pro-
cess for treason, felony, breach of the peace or misdemeanor.'7
One of the most difficult problems presented in connection
with the service of process is the amount of force an officer may
use. On this point there is an essential difference between the
rights of an officer executing a civil process and those of an
officer executing a criminal process, and the limitations on his
power are much less in the latter type of case.
It is a well settled principle of the common law that a man's
house is his castle and that within the limits of its walls he is
safe from all disturbance. But it is not disputed that an officer
in serving a criminal process may break into a house if he has
been refused admittance thereto or the warrant cannot other-
" Wyer v. Andrews, 13 Me. 168, 29 Am. Dec. 497.
'1C Cox v. Stricklind, 120 Ga. 104, 47 S. E. 912.
1'Section 4567, Ky. Stat.
14 Worth v. Norton, 56 S. C. 56, 33 S. E. 792, 45 A. L. R. 563.
Cameron v. Roberts, 87 Wis. 291, 58 N. W. 376.
"Davidson v. Barc7ay, 63 Pa. St. 406, 76 Am. St. Rep. 535.
2, Section 1981, Ky. Stat.
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wise be served.' 8 Thus, the sheriff has a right to break doors
to execute a warrant.19 It can readily be seen that the rule
could not be otherwise without allowing a man to defy the law
and to be entitled to the protection of the law in so doing. The
reason for the rule in the case of criminal process is perfectly
clear. This rule has been codified in Kentucky by statute: "In
executing a writ of habeas corpus or any criminal or penal pro-
cess requiring an actual arrest, the sheriff or other officer may
break open the outer door or any other door of the dwellings or
other house of the defendant, or any other person, if it be neces-
sary to enable him to make the arrest.''20 Also, the Criminal
Code provides that: "To make an arrest, an officer may break
open the door of a house in which the defendant may be, after
having demanded admittance and explained the purpose for
which admittance is desired." 21  The Kentucky decisions give
these provisions of the Statutes and Code full force and effect,
but do not extend their application beyond the strict letter of the
provisions. Accordingly, it was held in the case of Hawkins v.
Commonwealth,2 2 where the sheriff ih making an arrest broke
the doors of the house of a third party, that, although the sheriff,
in order to make an arrest, has a right to break the outer or inner
doors, yet he cannot break the house of a third party to arrest
a criminal who does not dwell in that house unless the person
to be arrested be actually in the house at the time of the entrance.
This strict construction of the statutory provisions makes it neces-
sary for an officer to proceed with a great deal more caution in
breaking the house of a third prson to serve a criminal process
than in breaking the house of the person on whom the process
is to be served. It will readily be seen that, according to the
statutory provisions and the cases decided in construing these
provisions, the rights of an officer in serving a criminal process
in Kentucky are comparatively extensive.
But an entirely different situation is presented in the case
of a civil process. It is a uniformly recognized rule of the com-
mon law that no officer has the legal authority to break an outer
" 14 B. Monroe (Ky.) 365, 65 Am. Dec. 147.
Com. v. Irvin, 1 Allen (Mass.) 587.
,* Section 4583, Ky. Stat.
2 Section 40, Crim. Code.2 14 B. Monroe 314.
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dIoor or other outside protection to an individual's dwelling
house for the purpose of executing a civil process.23 There is a
statutory provision on this subject in Kentucky which provides:
"If in levying a fieri facias, the outer door of .the dwelling house
of the defendant, in which his property is, be fastened, the sheriff
or other officer shall not break open the same to seize the prop-
erty. . "24 The statutes also further provide: "The
sheriff or other officer may break open the outer or any other
door of the dwelling or other house of a third person in which
the property of the defendant in the execution is fraudulently
concealed or kept.1125 Another section of the statutes, which
defines the power of an officer in serving other types of civil
process, and which depends for its meaning on the two sections
quoted, supra, provides as follows: "The sheriff or other officer
shall have the same power to break and enter the dwelling and
other houses of any person in executing apy other civil process,
which is given him to seize property under execution.''26 It
was held in the case of Jewell v. Mlts, 27 construing the statutory
provisions quoted supra, that an officer had no right to force
open an outer' door or window which was closed and fastened,
although he did not actually break the latch or catch in so doing.
The Civil Code provides that: "A sheriff having an order of
attachment, or for the delivery of property, may enter any build-
ing or inclosure containing the property, to take it; and if neces-
sary for this purpose, may break the building or inclosure,
having first publicly demanded'the property."28 Although this
provision applies to property only, the statutes further provide29
that an officer may have the same power in serving other kinds
of civil process as is given him to seize property under execu-
tion. An officer can not break the outer door of a person's
dwelling house to levy on property, but he may break the outer
door of a third person's house in which the property of the de-
fendant in the execution is fraudulently concealed or kept. Yet
21 Swan v. Miner, 8 Gray (Mass.) 182, 69 Am. Dec. 224; Kefy v.
chiiVler, 20 R. 1. 432, 39 AtI. 893; Note L. R. A. 1916D 282.
24Section 4580, Ky. Stat.
2Section 4581, Ky. Stat.
"Section 675, Ky. Civ. Code.
"13 Bush 62.
2" Section 4582, Ky. Stat.
9Supra (26).
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there are essential differences in the service of a process directed
to a person and one directed to property. This fact, it is sub-
mitted, necessarily presents many difficulties in interpreting the
provisions of the Kentucky statutes and code in liberalizing the
common law rule as to the force an officer may use in executing
a civil process.
Thus it is evident that the common law, jealous of intrusion
upon domestic peace and security, did not permit an officer to
break open an outer door of a person's dwelling house in order
to execute a civil process either upon the person or the property
of the individual upon whom the process was to be served. Every
man's house was deemed to be his castle, and an ordinary judi-
cial writ did not authorize the breaking of the outer door. But
Kentucky, wisely or unwisely as the case may be, has seen fit
to make certain changes in the common law rule calculated to
increase the authority of an officer of the law in executing a
civil prcoess. There are many good reasons which may be urged
in favor of these changes as well as argainst them. In the first
instance, it may be said that, if refused admission, an officer can
not execute a process unless he employes force to gain entrance
to the house wherein is the person on whom he is seeking to serve
the process. If a person on whom the court has directed a process
to be served refuses admission to the officer serving the process,
he may properly be deemed guilty of contempt of court and as
abusing his sanctuary by concealing himself within its closed
walls. But analagous reasoning is inconclusive. The object of
the legislature was clearly to supply what it deemed to "e a
defect in the common law. The purpose for causing process to
issue is to get jurisdiction of the person or property of the de-
fendant. And since the common law placed it in a person's
power to frustrate, to a certain extent, this purpose, our legis-
lature has seen fit to make certain changes and modifications by
statute. These changes are merely calculated to reduce the con-
trol of a contumacious person over the power and majesty of
the law.
It must be conceded, in the final analysis, that the question
as to the amount of force an officer may use in serving a civil
process is a problem involving a puzzling conflict of relative
rights, as well as considerations of public policy. On the one
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hand, the power and majesty of the law must be upheld by
giving full force and effect to all processes issuing from the
courts by immediate service thereof on the person of whom the
court is seeking to acquire jurisdiction. This is very important.
On the other hand, the law throws its protection around the
home and attempts to preserve the fine influences embodied
therein sacred and inviblate from all external disturbance. The
common law doctrine on this subject is perhaps adequate to
cover all situations that arise and all changes therefrom ought
to be made with the greatest precaution and after an earnest
consideration of the specific problems involved and of the evils
that may come from the proposed changes as well as the advan-
tages to be gained.
WooDsoN DENNIE SCOTT.
